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24 April 1961

Briefly Noted

Communist Bloc Broadcasts to Africa: The volume of Communist bloc radio broadcasts directed at African audiences continues to grow. Even Radio Warsaw has now joined the group (whose principal protagonists are still, of course, Moscow and Peking) with 21 hours weekly of broadcast programs in English and French. The English program opens with the announcement: "This is Radio Warsaw, voice of peace and friendship among nations, calling Africa." The line is not as militantly anti-American as that emanating from Peking (in this respect, at least, it more nearly follows the Radio Moscow line) and much of it is directed toward the Congo, with talk of how Dag Hammarskjold is interfering with the internal affairs of the Congo, about that martyr to freedom, Lumumba, etc., and to Angola, where it says the people are struggling for liberation, etc.

Food Situation Still Deteriorating in China: Reports continue to come in showing that the food situation in Communist China is growing even worse. Furthermore, the protocol covering trade between China and the USSR, signed on 7 April, made no mention of foodstuffs (apart from tea and sugar) although this previously has constituted a considerable percentage of Chicom trade with the USSR. Incidentally, according to one source (described as well-placed), the East German organization responsible for exporting complete industrial installations has ended its program at Chinese request. Examination of reports received during the past six months are described in one report as revealing beyond doubt that the Chinese authorities are faced with increasing discontent and public indiscipline due primarily to food shortages.

## 373. DISARMAMENT: Strategic Guidance

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Background: Some advocates of disarmament take it for granted that arms are a major cause of war. This view confuses a tool with the reason why it is used. Arms are manufactured because men wish to attack other men, or because they wish to repel or discourage attacks from other men. A limitation of arms might make a conflict less likely, but it will not prevent conflict. Logically, we can prevent war only if people cease to differ, or if they settle their differences by other means, such as a negotiated compromise, or submission to the decision of some commonly accepted authority such as the United Nations, a world court, or a neutral arbitrator. Nevertheless, it is true that arms can create a situation where, in a dispute, one party becomes afraid to spend further time seeking a possible peaceful settlement. He fears that if he does not start his attack, his opponent will start first with his. In 1914, this fear (of mobilization) ended the possibility of negotiation. It is a real danger again today, when the US and the USSR are able to strike each other with nuclear weapons in a matter of minutes. This is the most important reason why we (and the Soviet government too) have an interest in disarmament. Some other reasons include the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons to many countries, the danger of accidental war, the diversion to arms of resources that might be used for peaceful purposes, and the effects of military secrecy and nuclear fear on the working of democratic institutions.

A plea for disarmament, however, offers governments without an effective political opposition an excellent chance to increase their relative military strength, as compared with governments that have vocal and inquisitive critics. When the French and Germans modernized their artillery in the nineties, the Czar launched the first disarmament proposal; apparently he hoped to win time for Russia to catch up. Similarly, Litvinov in 1932, and Molotov and his successors since 1945, have been loud in their demands for "complete and general disarmament," and meanwhile the Soviet government has devoted itself to building arms. Propaganda for "complete and general disarmament" arouses sympathy among many people in free countries, who hope that this will mean an end of war and the costs of war. They bring pressure on their governments to conclude disarmament agreements, and meanwhile they try to limit arms expenditures by these governments. But if we signed with the Soviets a simple "good faith" agreement to limit or abolish arms, it is likely that the result would be the same as with our 1922 naval treaty with a warrior Japan: we would honor it and they would violate it. Motives and honesty aside, we cannot violate such an agreement without the world reading about it in the newspapers, while they can build up their armament with impunity, in secrecy.

There are ways to make a disarmament agreement work fairly: one would be to establish an international agency or commission, with rights to inspect, and this has been the aim of the US ever since we offered, in the Baruch proposals in 1946, to surrender all our atomic weapons and knowledge to such a body. After 1957, the Soviets appeared, in actual negotiation if not always in propaganda to accept in principle the idea of inspection. This led the United States to suggest a truce on testing while the US, UK and USSR attempted to negotiate a controlled test ban agreement.


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373. (Cont.)

We have made a number of moves to bring the negotiations to a successful end. Most recently in our March proposals, we included among a number of things the idea of permitting mutual inspection of any nuclear devices used in seismic research, and an extension of the proposed moratorium on small underground tests from 2 1/4 to 3 years. Perhaps the most striking Soviet statement on accepting inspection was made by Khrushchev on 21 March 1961, but on that same day, Semyon Tsarapkin was opening the nuclear test ban negotiations at Geneva with a statement that the USSR would insist on a three-man directorate -- a retreat from an earlier agreed position on a single, impartial administrator. There would be under the Soviet proposal Eastern, Western, and neutral members and all decisions would be unanimous. In other words, there would be no effective inspection, since the Soviet Union, if suspected of a violation, could veto any attempt to investigate the matter (or at least delay inspection, until they have removed all evidence of their violations). While this latest Soviet move is disappointing, we continue to seek an effective test ban agreement.

In making the three-man control proposals, both at Geneva and in the UN, the Soviets deny the possibility of impartiality (it is not explained how the "neutral" member will be chosen if impartiality is ruled out), and their intention, aside from the veto right, is either to make international organs unworkable, or else to subvert them for Communist purposes. With disarmament as with the UN, one always returns to the questions of whether there can be impartiality, whether differences can be settled by compromise, whether there is, in human survival, something more important than the program of one groups of political leaders. From the point of view of Soviet national interest, effective disarmament is a worthwhile goal, and in the recent past, there were some signs that this was realized in Moscow. But this has certainly not been the view in Peiping, and largely under Chinese influence, the Moscow Declaration of December 1960, reaffirmed the general intention of the Communist movement to eliminate -- not to compromise with -- all rivals. In specific terms war ("unleashed", of course, by the imperialists) was seen to be "possible" and "national liberation movements" were to be given military support. From Tsarapkin's behavior, it appears that Chinese pressure is making inroads on any impulse to disarm, and that the bloc is turning toward militant communism, which sees the dialectical struggle in terms of dog-eat-dog. From the militant point of view, there is no such thing as life without fighting (until all is Communist), hence there is no such thing as peace.



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375. Communism is NOT the 'Wave of the Future'

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Background: The assertion that ultimate Communist victory on a world-wide scale is inevitable, because it is "prescribed by the laws of history," already contained in Marx' determinist theory of historic materialism, has begun to assume new, much increased significance in the last few years. The area of Communist rule has kept expanding since the start of World War II. The Soviet Union swiftly recovered from the grievous losses of the war and made widely publicized advances in industry, military and scientific technology (notably space probes, rockets and missiles). Belief in the inevitability of Communist world conquest is increasingly reflected in statements by Communist leaders (e. g. Khrushchev's "we will bury you" and "your grandchildren will live under socialism") and in authoritative documents of Communist doctrine and policy, most recently in the Declaration of the leaders of 81 Communist Parties, released in Moscow on 6 December 1960 which states inter alia (underlinings added):

"the chief result of these (past three) years is the rapid growth of the might and international influence of the world socialist system, the vigorous process of disintegration of the colonial system under the impact of the national liberation movement, the intensification of class struggles in the capitalist world, and the continued decline and decay of the world capitalist system; the superiority of the forces of socialism over those of imperialism, of the forces of peace over those of war, is becoming ever more marked in the world arena."

The combined impact of both actual Communist advances and of their firm belief in the inevitability of further progress and ultimate victory, expressed in doctrine as well as in day-to-day propaganda, does not only imbue Communist leaders and activists with exaggerated over-confidence and arrogance, but it also influences the attitudes of increasingly broad segments of the non-Communist world, reducing the willingness of more and more governments and political parties to take a clear-cut anti-Communist stand. This growing tendency to believe in the "inevitability" of communism produces a "band-wagon-complex" which induces more and more people to yield to the Communist "wave of the future" (just as many non-Nazis in Hitler's first years were over-awed by the Nazi "wave of the future"), as typified by the well-known defeatist aphorism "better red than dead."

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Background: Modern totalitarian parties seem to require a general guide-book (witness Mein Kampf) for the use of their members, directing and encouraging them, and outlining their party's methods and goals. Party leaders cannot handle such books, with party-wide circulation, as classified documents, and the books offer to the party's intended victims a surprisingly clear picture of what the party has in store for them. The current (published 1959) official guide for members of the CPSU and all CP's following Moscow's leadership, is the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Since this party bible numbers some 736 pages in its English translation, and is highly repetitive, the only persons outside the movement who are likely to read it are the professional Sovietologists. But Wolfgang Leonhard, who is one of the best-informed and most articulate defectors from the East, has made a thorough study of this book and has written lucid, authoritative articles about it, one of which, Moscow's Plans for Western Europe is attached.

Although Leonhard's article is aimed at West German readers, and discusses the application of the Fundamentals to Western Europe, the program he describes is intended to apply to any nation which has attained more than rudimentary economic and political development; it would presumably hold for India and Japan, for example. The essence of the Kremlin's program is that, where outright seizure of power through civil war or military defeat has not been possible, Communist control is to be achieved by oblique means, by penetrating and then directing and concentrating all the groups which are or can be made hostile to the powers that be. When such forces have come to power by "legal" or at least by non-violent means, the dupes are gradually replaced, potential opponents are silenced, and the government is progressively brought into closer and closer alignment with the USSR until finally the "stage of socialism" is achieved and the Kremlin has another satellite. In other words, the Soviets seek to use the concept of "revisionism" against the capitalists. This program is in fact too revisionist for the Chinese Communists, who dislike these grays and pastels; they have a different bible (Mao's writings) and regard peaceful revolution as an illusion.

It must be granted that the Soviet plan sounds as though it might work: we should certainly not underestimate it. Khrushchev believes this to be the "wave of the future." In some respects, however, it is harder for such a development to succeed today than in the more innocent heyday of the "Popular Front," although on the other hand, the Soviet missile threat now supports non-Bloc CP's at long range, by blackmail. The critical points are whether the Communists can capture control of actual and potential opposition elements, and whether they can unite these elements under their leadership into a powerful, perhaps majority, movement (while dividing and intimidating those whom they cannot win over). These questions must be decided mainly within the opposition elements themselves; official repression by governments is likely only to increase dissatisfaction and make it more susceptible to Communist manipulation.

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**Background:** The Central Committee Plenum of the East German Communist Party, SED (Socialist Unity Party), which met 15 - 17 December 1960, following Ulbricht's return from the Moscow Conference, appears to have marked a turning point in the foreign and domestic policies of East Germany. At the plenum, Walter Ulbricht outlined a Party program which indicated there was no impending settlement of the Berlin problem, the major source of East Germany's current difficulties. Apparently, the SED leadership has finally accepted the fact that Khrushchev will not be persuaded to precipitate a crisis because of West Berlin at this time. The tenor of Ulbricht's speech and the proceedings of the Plenum as a whole emphasized long-range plans. Ulbricht acknowledged the crux of East Germany's difficulties when he said: "We are obliged to compete with imperialist and capitalist West Germany with open frontiers.... This is not easy."

Ulbricht's dilemma stems from the proximity and accessibility of West Germany the prosperity and affluence of which East Germany cannot hope to match. For once, the citizens of a Communist country had a choice: West Germany was there as a standard of comparison and West Berlin was there as an escape corridor. The reaction of the East German citizenry is well known. Since 1949, over two and a half million persons have left East Germany for the West. More than half of these escaped through West Berlin. In the year 1960 the percentage fleeing through Berlin rose to approximately 75 percent. Included in the group of 200,000 persons who fled to West Germany in 1960, were more than 600 doctors, 275 dentists, 2,450 engineers and technicians, as well as many other professional men and intellectuals. The consequence of this mass exodus of skilled workers and professionals has been an acute shortage of labor, which has plagued the regime and raised havoc with economy. However, because he has been obliged to subordinate the immediate interests of East Germany to those of the Soviet Union (in this case, the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence"), Ulbricht has been prevented from taking measures sufficient to seal off the Berlin escape hatch. As he put it in his speech to the Plenum: "There are other problems which do not depend on us alone and we need a little more time to solve them."

In other sectors the situation is the following:

**Refugees:** In addition to the figures cited above: during the years 1956 to 1960 inclusive, a total of over one million refugees fled to West Germany. More than 5,200 East Germans fled to West Berlin over the Easter week end in addition to the 30,000 who had escaped during the first three months of the year. During the first quarter of 1961, 33,981 persons registered at Marienfelde reception center, compared with 22,986 during the same period last year. Despite Ulbricht's measures to placate the populace and the promises of extensive concessions to professionals and intellectuals, the exodus from East Germany is continuing. (Total flights to West Berlin and West Germany in the first three months of 1961 total 46,000 as against 33,150 in 1960.)

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Economy: In 1958 and 1959, the East German economic situation improved. During the latter part of 1960, however, it began to deteriorate: the industrial growth rate slowed and there were serious difficulties in agriculture as a result of the untimely forced collectivization campaign. These problems were accentuated by West Germany's threat to cut off trade after 31 December in retaliation for East Germany's imposition of additional restrictions on travel in the East Zone of Berlin. At this critical juncture, the Soviet Union evidently declined to provide the special assistance requested and indicated that Ulbricht should adjust his plans to the situation and come to terms with the West Germans. At the end of the 12th Central Committee Plenum (mid-March 1961), the regime announced that the rate of industrial growth for 1961 would be only 7.2 percent - the lowest since 1957. The Seven-Year Plan (1959 - 1965) calls for a 9.4 average annual growth rate; in 1960 East Germany achieved a rate of 8.3 percent. In what may be the first step in a general reorientation of resource the regime also announced that it is dissolving the aircraft industry and diverting its personnel and facilities to other industries. The lower industrial output goals are the result of difficulties in the metalworking industry, continuing lags in the construction and investment programs, inadequate supplies of high-quality raw materials, foreign trade problems, and large losses of manpower through defection. State Planning Committee Chairman Bruno Leuschner admitted to the 12th Plenum: "We have no manpower reserves."

Agriculture: The consequences of Ulbricht's ill-advised total collectivization campaign of last year still plague the regime. Farmers are resisting collectivization through such means as slaughtering livestock, arson, etc. During the first ten months of 1960 more than 13,000 farmers fled the country. The regime apparently is counting on improved agitprop methods to induce farmers to cooperate and appears reluctant at present to the measures it used earlier to force collectivization.

Party: The morale of both functionaries and rank and file Party members has been severely shaken by the burden of unrealistic economic goals, by shake-ups and reorganizations, and above all by the inescapable necessity of adjusting to Khrushchev's policy of detente in a Party whose leaders both by dint of experience and current necessity are uncompromisingly Stalinist. Following the breakdown of the summit meeting in Paris, SED members were bitterly disappointed at Khrushchev's refusal to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and many were openly critical. All the SED pleadings to Khrushchev about sealing off the Berlin escape hatch have been rebuffed and it is obvious he has told the East Germans that the Berlin problem would be solved at a time and in a manner of Soviet choosing within the larger context of Soviet relations with the United States. When Ulbricht returned from the November-December 1960 Conference in Moscow, he apparently recognized that a reorientation was inevitable. Moreover, it is likely that Ulbricht had been rebuked by the Soviets for his reluctance or inability to repress "sectarian and dogmatic" tendencies in the Party as well as for his failure to make his program palatable to the people. The SED has continued its purge of weak or vacillating members. Party

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
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officials responsible for the purges are former Defense Minister Willi Stoph and cadre chief Alfred Neumann, both politburo members and hardline Communists. Several of East Germany's 14 districts have undergone drastic shake-ups of Party and state organizations. As a result of this mass screening more and more SED members are fleeing to the West. However, there is still no evidence that a strong opposition element is developing within the party such as that which was led by Karl Schirdewan prior to his ouster in February 1958. There is evidence, though, that some party leaders are critical of Ulbricht's "softer line" policies and the intensity of the latter's attacks on "sectarians" suggests that these officials are pressing for the adoption of more drastic and aggressive measures.

The East German regime appears to be reorganizing its party, state and security forces. The present leaders - Stoph, Neumann and Ulbricht -- are definitely committed to Stalinist methods. Of Rau and Premier Grotewohl, who may have exercised a moderating influence in the past, the former is dead and the latter appears to have lost influence. Given the composition and character of the present SED leadership, it would appear that any genuine implementation of a new "moderate course" will be a slow and painful process. Also to be considered in this context - however unlikely it may appear at present - is the possibility that Khrushchev will decide that in any attempt to reach negotiated agreement for a neutralized Germany, Ulbricht and company are too great a liability and therefore will encourage the replacement of the current SED leadership with elements who would be more effective, but also more amenable to the Soviet requirements.

Guidance: In all cases, the information should be handled as follows:



Background: Both the USSR and Communist China are increasing the extent of their propaganda effort in Africa to increase popularity. The chief immediate aim of both appears to be twofold: first, to establish diplomatic and other relations, especially with the newly-independent states, regardless of the political coloring of their governments; second, to supply support (moral, economic, and sometimes military materiel) to selected African regimes, e. g. Guinea, Zanzibar, and the Gizenga groups in the Congo. Concurrently, an increasing stream of propaganda comes from both countries.

Radio: Both countries are abusive about the free world, the Chicombs particularly aiming at the US. In the latter part of February, Moscow's daily coverage aimed at Africa was 6 1/2 hours (2 3/4 hours in English, 2 3/4 hours in French, 1 hour in Swahili) in addition to 7 hours per day in Arabic. At the same time, the volume of Peking's daily broadcasts to African audiences was 13 hours per day (7 hours in English, some of which is beamed primarily to Southeast Asia, 4 hours in French, which is directed to Europe as well as Africa, 1 hour in Portuguese, and 1 hour in Cantonese) in addition to 2 hours daily in Arabic.

News Agencies: Tass and the New China News Agency have established offices in Cairo, Rabat, Accra, and Conakry, while the services of both have been accepted in Bamako, Mali.

Periodicals and Publications: Well-produced printed material from both countries, in addition to that produced by local Communist front organizations, is distributed by diplomatic and trade missions, mailing, news agencies, and bookshops. Sino-Soviet propaganda is also carried out by less direct means.

Education: The People's Friendship University in Moscow (which plans to have a student body of 3-4,000) had recently enrolled some 500 students from African, Asian, and Latin American countries.


Visits by Delegations: Delegations from Africa have been invited by all the bloc countries; China, while unable to equal the USSR in other respects, has taken the lead in this. Well over 100 African delegations have visited Communist China and been given the red-carpet treatment during the past two years while more than 25 Chicom delegations visited Africa.

Friendship Societies and "Solidarity" Days: Friendship Societies are being organized by both countries in Africa and it is these which are used, among other things, to establish the "solidarity" days (e. g. "Congo Day" last August 1).

Use of Communist Fronts: Widespread use is made of Communist front organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, and an organization perhaps less suspect to African eyes than the more notorious fronts but nevertheless permeated with Communist influence: the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization.

The success of the Sino-Soviet effort in Africa was most recently demonstrated in the series of strong anti-Western resolutions issued by the Third All-African People's Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in April 1961. Although this

conference did not represent African governments, it was comprised of groups who represent a sizeable and increasingly vocal number of Africans.



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## 379. The Fight Against Castro

Background: On 21 March 1961, the Cuban Revolutionary Council was formed uniting various groups of Cubans opposed to the pro-Communist dictatorship of Fidel Castro. Dr. Miro Cardona was selected to head the group. Miro Cardona was the first premier of Cuba after the overthrow of the Batista government by the forces of Castro in January 1959. A long-time opponent of Batista, he was for many years one of Cuba's most distinguished lawyers, and a champion of social justice and economic reform. Two major movements make up the council: the Democratic Revolutionary Front, headed by Antonio Varona, and the Revolutionary Movement of the People, headed by Manuel Ray. Varona was the leader of the anti Batista underground in Havana before the rise of Castro. Ray was a leader of the leftist, but non-Communist, element in Castro's 26 July Movement and served as Castro's minister of transportation. These men and their colleagues, in other words, represent the progressive Cuban elements who initially were with Castro but who turned against him as his identification with communism became apparent and as he betrayed the ideals of democratic reform for which they had originally believed he stood.

On 8 April, the Cuban Revolutionary Council issued a call to arms giving their program for a new Cuban government in addition to calling on Cubans to rise up against Castro. The Council promised military assistance to the guerrillas fighting against Castro in the Escambray Mountains, and two other Cuban provinces. The call to arms made clear the dedication of the council to democratic reform. It stated inter alia, "the nation's progress depends directly upon the well-being of the workers and peasants."

In the early morning hours of 17 April, forces of the Council made landings in Cuba. They encountered Castro units equipped with Soviet tanks and were attacked by aircraft. On 19 April, their positions had been destroyed. However, some units may have succeeded in linking up with the anti-Castro guerrillas.

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BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

NUMBER 64  
ADDENDUM  
24 April 1961

- Item #367 - Attachment: Adam Schaff articles on PHILOSOPHY OF MAN. #3 and #4 Freedom and Historical Necessity; and #5 Moral Responsibility.
- Item #373 - Guidance Item entitled DISARMAMENT - Strategic Guidance included in this issue, dated 10 April 1961. Attachment: Figures on U.S. and U.S.S.R. Armed Forces to be used in connection with this item.
- Item #376 - Attachment: Moscow's Plans for the Future of Western Europe. A translation is attached herewith of the article by Wolfgang Leonhard, which appeared in Die Zeit (Hamburg, Germany) on 10 February 1961 as "Moskaus Zukunftsplan fur Westeuropa." It is suggested that copies of the Fundamentals itself might be provided to contacts who are qualified to handle questions of Communist doctrine; they should use this source for particular lessons applying to their own country, possibly publicizing these lessons through a series of articles, or in pamphlets, lectures or other suitable vehicles. (Copies of the English translation may be obtained from the Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. It is likely that other translations will be found in Marxist bookstores in many areas.) Further, copies of an English translation of an article by a Czech Communist, Jan Kozak, on "How Parliament Can Play a Revolutionary Role in the Transition to Socialism and the Role of the Popular Masses," are being reproduced and will be attached to a future Bi-Weekly. This article gives a frank account of how power was seized in Czechoslovakia, and suggests that the same methods should be used elsewhere; case officers will wish to consider giving it black circulation.
- Item #379 - See Press Comment, dated 23, 24 and 25 March 1961 and 11 April 1961 for material on the Cuban Revolutionary Council, including biographical material on its leaders, and the call to arms. Attention is also called to President Kennedy's 20 April 1961 address to the American Newspaper Editors, which is carried in Press Comment, dated 21 April 1961. See New Leader editorial carried in Press Comment dated 26 April 1961 for especially effective statement of the U.S. Case.

ERRATA: Attachment to Item #368, Bi-Weekly Guidance #63, 10 April 1961 should be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

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## ADAM SCHAFF's PHILOSOPHY OF MAN

### FOREWORD

This report consists of parts three and four of a serialized article by Adam Schaff published in the Polish-language periodical Prezegląd Kulturalny (Cultural Review) Warsaw. Volume, number, date, and page appear under individual article headings.

Parts one and two of this serialized article were published as JPRS: 8000.

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PHILOSOPHY OF MAN (3)

FREEDOM AND HISTORICAL NECESSITY

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16 March 1961,  
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CPYRGHT

We concluded our cogitations on the meaning of life by defining socialist humanism as militant humanism. Said we: Not only does socialist humanism compel one to have clearcut opinions. It makes one act, and fight. One must fight for the attainment of aims that determine the sense of life, for the re-shaping of social relationships as a condition of such realization, for winning the people over to the cause of humanism, for the change in their attitudes. But is man in a position to do this? Man is a social creature. Can he at the same time be the creator of social life? Does not the historical necessity as recognized by Marxists limit the freedom of the human individual and so, in effect, does it not weaken the individual's will to fight? These few queries bring us into the thick of problems of determinism and of free will, known for so long, and in our times most often seen under the heading "Man, and History"

It is not my intention here to discuss the problems of free will in their entirety. I will only refer to one of the aspects of free will, decisively important in connection with the dispute between Marxism, and existentialism and its partisans in our own country. For myself, two matters are, first and foremost, involved: 1) How to understand the status of the human individual. This is the crux of the dispute with the existentialists and, appearances to the contrary, there are many points in common between existentialism and the Marxists, and that is precisely why the respective positions must be clearly delineated, and 2) whether such individual may mold his own fate, and if so, to what extent.

The problem of individual freedom has been traditionally conceived in a scholastic manner, and such approach to this day burdens all speculation in this field. Moreover, it is accompanied by such an array of semantic errors (in the sense of inadequate delimitation of concepts as to their meaning, and of use of vague and ambiguous terms) that the entire matter is in a very sorry shap indeed.

On the one hand, the partisans of determinism most frequently confined themselves to proving that human acts - just like everything that happens in the world - result from determining causes, that there is always a cause. As if the matter of individual freedom boiled down to the possibility that acts may exist that did not result from determining causes: The upshot of it was that the partisans of determinism thus understood had to rack their brains in order to avoid the fatalistic consequences of their own opinions, in order to defend the concept of an active, creative part played by the individual in the social processes.

On the other hand, the opponents of determinism moved, in their speculations, within boundaries traced by "proofs" that were rather amusing from the logical point of view: I may drink a glass of water but then I may leave it alone, I may turn right at a crossroads but then I may turn left as well, and so my actions are free. As if they could not understand that one is free not to drink a glass of water only until the thirst compels him to do it. In a similar manner, one is free to choose either of the roads before him, e.g. one may turn to the left, only if one is not travelling in order to reach an objective to be found at the end of the road turning to the right. This is an easy and inexpensive discussion indeed but is this what we are after? The matters involved are much deeper even though concealed among numerous, also verbal, misunderstandings. First of all, one discusses the topics of the freedom of human individual as if the notion "human individual" were a clear one and as if it did not play any part whatsoever in the dispute. And it is precisely here that the dispute originates, and is more deep-rooted than anywhere else.

Should one reach over to the sources of divergences between Marxism and Sartre's existentialism, their chief factor - as I wrote elsewhere - will be found precisely in the concept of human individual. According to Sartre (at any rate, according to the Sartre of "L'Être et le Néant" period) the human individual is an autonomous creature, absolute master of his own fate and, therefore, lonely and condemned to freedom. In consequence, his life is going on in continuous (existentialist) fear. A strange concept indeed for anyone familiar with the elementary verities of sociology, social psychology, anthropology or other sciences concerning man. It is true one may bring up the fact that Sartre in his "Critique de la raison dialectique" refers, precisely, to sociology and to its results, however it only means that the concept is being devoured by its internal conflict. Apart from this, it is not the only conflict of the concept, and I had the opportunity of proving it elsewhere.

Since time immemorial, people have felt psychologically irked when told they did not enjoy an absolute freedom of decision (meaning, of course, that under the circumstances they were not subjected to physical constraint, limiting their field of action). This was not only because of man's proud feeling that, if unwilling, he does not have to

drink coffee even though he likes it (whereafter, his philosophical self-consciousness fortified, he just drinks it up) but because, generally speaking, he considers himself a perfect being. In this, he is greatly helped by Biblical reminiscences and by other irrational factors galore that fully obscure his opinion concerning these subtle matters. For what is there more irrational (we rule out the common ignorance of fundamental problems of social life of people, often betrayed by philosophers showing off their "originality") than the voicing today, at the time of powerful development of sciences concerning man, of the thesis of the allegedly autonomous individual, allegedly "lonely," allegedly "condemned to freedom"? In order to avoid misunderstandings, I wish to say (even though I wrote about it many a time) that in each and every one of these definitions I see not lack of sense alone but a real problem as well, concealed behind mystified form. At the same time, I think that in this false - as I believe it to be - concept of the problem of the individual, the deep errors have their roots, the errors concerning the way one conceives freedom of the individual, and the individual-society relationship.

For the sake of the battle about to be joined, to the existentialist thesis of man's loneliness I oppose the contrary thesis, namely that from birth to death the human individual, even in his most intimate experiences, is tied to other people as closely as can be, that he is deeply "social," socially conditioned, and at every pace shaped up by the society. In the light of modern knowledge of man this is, to a certain extent, a trivial thesis, and I present it as such; but it is precisely its triviality that constitutes the sharpest criticism directed at its adversaries. In fact, the problem does not consist in overcoming the philosophically fabricated "loneliness" of man (of course, in everyday life, people are lonesome without quotation marks but that is another story) but in surmounting and, under certain circumstances, limiting the way a man is shackled by the society (and this may be negative, e.g. in the sense of perception, and provides the sociology of knowledge with quite a bit of trouble).

It is easy indeed to prove the determining influence of the society upon a man's Psyche, upon his opinions and, in consequence, upon the manner of appraising things and of deciding the selection of the way to act. The heart of the matter is much deeper down: Ever and anywhere, man is a creature of society and, in a certain sense of the word, a reflection of its relationships. This is what young Marx had in mind when he supplied the formulation, classical for the Marxism of today, that the essence of man is not a visionary notion rooted in man but, in its reality, the whole of social relationships (Theses on Buerbach, 6).

This, of course, is a figurative form of statement, it is a metaphor, however its purport is relatively simple. As long ago as the XVIIIth century, John Locke dealt a blow to nativism. And even though opinions made their appearance at a later date to the effect that man

comes into this world with inborn imperatives and moral ideas, whether due to his psycho-physical structure or to supranatural reasons: even though one could, even today, deduce such opinions from certain theories - one is entitled to consider such theories vanquished, and to believe that their partisans are but isolated cranks. The genetic empiricism rules the roost not in psychology alone but in the field of other sciences of man as well. Man is not born with determined opinions, attitudes, moral feelings and customs; these are shaped up in a man under the influence of social education. This precisely, accounts for the differences between men, and it even explains the contrarieties (including the most delicate realms of moral feelings, the feeling of shame etc.) found not only over various periods but even in the same period in various societies, and under various conditions.

First of all, this is due to the action of language which is the society's accumulated knowledge of the world, conveyed by the society to each of its members. These are the first signs, graven upon that tabula rasa, the child's mind. The importance of these signs is so great, and so deep their influence upon human Psyche because - and research is there to prove it - the language system also influences the system of thinking, the way man sees the world and, at any rate, his classification of the phenomena of reality.

It is through the medium of language that man's mind and attitudes are shaped up by various social phenomena: The accumulated knowledge of Universe, customs and beliefs, the system of interhuman relations which constitutes a reflection of the contemporary needs of production, political institutions, the prevalent tastes, artistic and otherwise etc. Man cannot leap out of his social frame. Even as a pioneer, a rebel, and a wrecker of the existing order of things, man is part and parcel of the given social relationships whose creature he is. Thus, Jehovah did what was both consistent and right when he forbade anyone born in slavery to enter the Promised Land, destined to be that of freedom.

All these factors: The language the society hands down to the child, the beliefs, customs, moral feelings, artistic tastes, political opinions, theoretical and practical knowledge, personal examples etc. etc. - are connected with determined social relations. For all these cases mean the determined forms of humans' activities undertaken in common, and the results of such activities. Born and bred, man finds precisely these human relations which constitute the relevant human social system. Man cannot, of course, choose such system to his liking. The system is the environment man finds. It shapes him up, and makes him what he is. One may find an abundance of examples when comparing the opinions, customs and attitudes of men of a certain nationality over various periods of time, or those of members of various social-cultural strata of society over one and the same period. Unless one is a racist, and believes in some mystical "Spirit of the Nation" (whose existence, incidentally, is denied by the changes such spirit undergoes over various periods and under varying conditions), then one must agree to what is

shown by modern science, namely to man's being a creature of society, the creature of determined social relations whose reflection - in some special meaning of this word - one finds in his Psyche, in his opinions, customs and attitudes. This is what Marxism meant when stating that the essence of man (in other words, all that is common to all men and, at the same time, constitutes the difference between man and the remaining living world) is the whole of social relationships.

Therefore, one may believe the matter to be clear in this, its general aspect. What remains to be done is to investigate the mechanics of such influence and dependence in a detailed and scrupulous manner. But this is another story.

But here are the conclusions this offers with regard to the problem we are interested in: Human attitudes and opinions are social-conditioned, social-determined by the simple fact that the human individual is a social creature, "the whole of social relationships." And this, precisely, changes the picture altogether: It appears that, with regard to a certain approach at least, the human individual is not the starting point but the final one. Obviously, a peculiar dialectics plays its part here: The individual is the creature and, simultaneously, the creature. He is both the final and the starting point. This makes this complex situation so difficult to understand and to decipher. One thing, however, is certain: Once the dialectic is understood, the entire subjectivist construction crumbles. This is the construction whereof existentialism is but an example, and according to which the human individual as creator of history is definitely the starting point, in need of no research or elucidation. Just like Descartes' cogito, the existentialists' homo agens is the allegedly simple foundation, calling for no further analysis. On this foundation, the entire construction is erected, with its categories of freedom, of condemnation to choice, of loneliness and fear. Homo agens is the foundation of existentialism, and together they fall down. But, unfortunately, there is no such foundation: Not in the sense that there is no homo agens in reality but in the sense that he appears in a way different from that desired by the existentialists: Not as an isolated individual, autonomously choosing and deciding on the basis of "free will" Not as a monad as described by Leibnitz, windowless and isolated, in its loneliness receiving no counsel or help from anywhere. On the contrary, he appears as an individual who is social in his every movement, who is never by himself for, even when alone, his thoughts are socially shaped and controlled. He is an individual always in a certain sense helped by social advice and using it, an individual whose decision and choice are always socially determined, and never free in the sense given that word by existentialists.

Da liegt der Hund begraben. The existentialists' entire concept of freedom, their entire anti-determinist frenzy, the entire grudge born Marxism (and Engels in particular) by Sartre and his followers for Marxian recognition of the objective nature of laws of history, and



especially for conceiving such laws as a statistical resultant of individual actions - all these are connected with the premises concerning the human individual and his social status. As usual, such premises are arbitrary, and since in addition they are evidently false, the entire construction reminds one of the proverbial house of cards. This is made even more censurable by facts clearly appearing in the light of modern science, and which should have obliged the existentialists at least to consider the fundamental thesis of the theory, at least to cite some arguments justifying it, and which explicitly forbid arbitrary assumptions based upon the subjectivists' metaphysical opinions drawn from philosophy's attic. For this is genuine and authentic: This ultra-modern and ultra-fashionable concept is based upon a mercilessly obsolete foundation, reeking of mothballs. Only amidst the boundless ignorance of philosophy and the complete political chaos that over a certain period prevailed among certain Polish groups could the gushing raptures make their appearance over the originality of "native" concepts in this field, which in fact were but a true copy of existentialist patterns. But then it must be supposed this happened because at that time anyone speaking out against Marxism was considered an original thinker.

## PHILOSOPHY OF MAN (4)

### FREEDOM AND HISTORICAL NECESSITY

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The problem of the laws of history, and of their objective nature will not be considered here. While connected with matters of interest to us, it is a separate one, contained within the range of social science theory and methodology, and which calls for a different mode of study. At any rate, it's something else that perplexes us in this context, namely the point is not whether the laws of history are truly objective in nature but whether, assuming that such laws exist, there remains some sphere of human freedom, of creative formation of social life, and if so, what is that sphere.

We will begin by the latter of the two principal problems, i.e. by that of the possibility of man's creatively affecting the social reality, and of the limits to such influence. In so doing, we view the problem of freedom at a special angle. And, without going into the details of the dispute concerning determinism, thus have we to consider it.

First of all, one must clear the approaches to the dispute, and discard the queries which, due to the ambiguity of the word "freedom" burden the problems interesting us, remaining, however, outside the problem proper.

When colloquially referring to "freedom," generally and frequently we have in mind the meaning of such word constituting the opposite to the word "constraint." According to such meaning, man is free when no force, physical or otherwise compels him to act in a certain way or another, i.e. when he is both entitled and able to choose such action or another. Conversely, a man is not free when deprived of the right and possibility of choice, and by some compulsion forced to act in a determined - though possibly salutary - way. Nobody likes constraint and, therefore, everyone - except for those who apply it - opposes it, thus remaining a partisan of freedom understood to be freedom from compulsion. When referring to free will as opposed to determinism, one certainly refers to something different from the freedom from compulsion. When referring to free will as opposed to determinism, one certainly refers to something different from the freedom from compulsion. But, first, not everyone understands it and, second, even understanding it one, willy nilly, gives way to the elemental and irrational dislike of all argumentation against free will. While a purely emotional reaction,

it clearly intervenes in the sphere of intellect. Determinism denies freedom, and so it is against freedom (meaning: freedom from compulsion): This, obviously, is a paralogism based upon a logical slip, that widespread error. Therefore, let us discard misunderstandings and paralogisms. We are, all of us, in favor of freedom in its first meaning, even though we may argue about the range of its application and the need for checks, in particular when the limitation of freedom for the sake of defense of freedom is discussed (the bard of the existentialist concept of freedom of the individual unreservedly expressed his solidarity with Fidel Castro's opinions concerning the need for stifling counter-revolution by main force and, in principle, no rational fighter for political freedom can have any misgivings in this connection). Furthermore, this is not our subject when discussing freedom of individual, and the historical necessity. Let us try to remember this, and not confuse the issue in further deliberations.

When we go on to the problem of freedom of individual in its narrower meaning, we are confronted by three ways of understanding the word "freedom": 1) Free is who acts due to emanations of a will undetermined by anything whatsoever, 2) free is who is not subject to the action of any objective necessities of historical progress, 3) freedom means the possibility of choice of one among several variants of action (we will revert to this further in the discussion).

The lovers of "Freedom" base their arguments mainly upon the first and second meanings among those mentioned, even though in my opinion - the problem proper is connected with the third one.

To connect the matter of freedom of individual with indeterminism is quite understandable in the light of the assumption of the false concept of human individual as above referred to. Through simple deduction, this concept of individual leads to the unavoidable recognition of absolute freedom, i.e. of indeterminism, which indeterminism is, for its part, a fundamental element of the subjectivist concept of the individual. For thousands of years, this bond between freedom and indeterminism has been present in the history of this problem. However, it is nothing but a gross misunderstanding, an error that cannot withstand criticism.

One assumption at least is necessary to identify freedom with a will unaffected by anything whatsoever, namely the assumption that some phenomena may exist without any cause. This however can only be assumed by a mystic for whom there is no value in experience, whether empirical or scientific. A psychologist or a sociologist will, of course, oppose the assertion that any acts of will, and so decisions concerning the choice of action exist that have no antecedent cause whatsoever. Even the soberer defenders of indeterminism will not accept this assertion when formulated in so general a way. Therefore, we may consider this version to be a misunderstanding.

The second version plays a more important part: It does not claim that there may be acts of will without antecedent causes. It states there are no outward necessities of historical development that should leave the acting individual helpless, i.e. compelled to conform, or deprive him of freedom. While also based upon a misunderstanding, this version comprises an important problem: Whether, and within what confines an individual is an autonomous creator of social reality and, in consequence, of his own fate?

This second, moderate version of indeterminism cannot be as easily brushed aside, precisely because it contains a real problem and, moreover, it implies a number of other problems.

First of all, this concerns the existence itself of objective laws of historical development, and of determined necessities of such development. As I have said above, I will not discuss this complex problem here; it forms part of concrete social sciences. I base my speculation upon the accepted existence of such laws since otherwise the problem as such disappears. All I wish to note is that the opposition - and it is violent - against the recognition of an objective nature of laws of history, an opposition also supported by certain "renovators" of Marxism is aimed against the Marxist concept, and can only be explained in terms of mystified consciousness, as referred to by the sociology of knowledge. Today, no serious social scientist may deny that there are objective regular phenomena in the development of society (had they not been recognized, all the research work done by empirical sociology would have been Sisyphean), and, in particular, regular phenomena connected with the changes in the society's economic basis. One may also point to a series of modern non-Marxist social science schools, in history in particular (ranging from the materialistically situated economic history to Toynbee's idealistic theory) which recognize the objective nature of the laws of social progress. We will go further: Marx' theory of the part played by the economic basis in the development of society has become so widely accepted in modern science that sometimes one is apt to forget its genesis. This, no doubt, is the finest success to be achieved by a scientific theory. To the sociologists of knowledge, the attacks against the corresponding Marxian concept have, in its light, a peculiar savor all their own.

But let us return to the main problem. We assumed that the thesis was correct of the objective nature of laws of social development, and of the necessity of certain processes connected therewith. Does that mean that an individual ceases to be free when subjected to the action of such objective necessities? As usual, all this depends upon our understanding of freedom, upon what are the assumptions made in connection with the questions posed. First and foremost, two such assumptions play a part here.

Let us begin with the thesis that only absolute, unlimited freedom constitutes genuine freedom. For this is assumed by those who state that in recognizing certain regular phenomena and the necessities connected therewith, one loses freedom. But nobody, not even the most

zealous defender of the thesis of objective nature of laws of history goes as far as to say that such laws predetermine the decisions and acts of every individual (even though they do affect them), and certainly never as far as to proclaim the determination by such laws of all human decisions and actions. One should say, in a general manner, that advocating the thesis of objective necessity in historical development, all one advocates is the conviction concerning the results of historical processes, and not the freedom of human acts that may be of all description, including those opposed to the objective trend of development. Those who complain about limitations or even obliteration of their freedom when certain laws of history are at work, in fact complain not because they are not enjoying freedom of action but because such action cannot yield the results they desire. But this has nothing in common with freedom of individual: it is connected but with voluntaristic longings, expressed in a vague manner. If Mr. X really believes he is not free when society-wide processes do not comply with his desires, he has only himself to blame for a false and non-scientific approach to the problem.

Thus, the viewpoint we have analyzed boils down to the assumption that man is free solely when he is absolutely free, i.e. when nothing affects his decisions and nothing limits them; further, that he is free only when the social processes and their results are in keeping with his will. It is sufficient to decipher the purport of such assumption or assumptions, usually concealed in a nebula of general and very ambiguous formulations to discern their manifest groundlessness. This is particularly true when dealing with the concept of freedom brought down to voluntarism.

The viewpoint of interest to us implies a further assumption yet: That historical necessity is outside the men acting, that it emerges in a way independent of their action. A truly mystical concept, this. While it has nothing in common with the opinions voiced by the defenders of the thesis of the objective nature of history laws, it leads the dispute astray, into the wilderness of misunderstandings.

Marxist determinism understands historical necessity as a force that does not act outside men and independent of them but - quite the contrary - through human action. History is made by men, but their acts and decisions are affected by the environmental conditions and by the needs brought about by such conditions. There is nothing going on apart from people or independent of them; furthermore, there is nothing mystical in what is going on. The changes in production systems or in other social phenomena simply bring determined needs about, and this is followed by corresponding endeavors and acts. It is obvious that those whose interests are undermined by such developments will be against them both in their thoughts and actions. And the matter becomes much more complex due to the fact that not material interests alone affect a man's attitude: Such attitudes will not be uniform within groups either interested or uninterested in progress. Proof: Socialist revolutionaries among the bourgeois, and counter-revolutionaries among proletarians.

The naive pre-judgment of men's attitudes according to their class background belongs with the childhood diseases of socialism. For a Marxist, for the partisan of the determinist concept in social problems, these facts are not particularly embarrassing. This, of course, is true if Marxism and its determinism are not vulgarized.

Therefore, we only say that people act under the influence of various incentives, and that they act in a variety of ways. However, certain incentives are so overpowering that the number of men succumbing to them keeps growing. What we call necessity is nothing else than the statistical resultant of an enormous number of individual acts, among which however a certain type of attitude and action emerges victorious after a certain time.

Therefore, nothing without men. On the contrary, everything through men. Thus, if rationally interpreted, freedom of action is not violated. Best proof: In the course of social upheavals, men effect various choices and act in a variety of ways, independent of, or even opposed to, the so-called historical necessity. There are among them revolutionaries, and also counter-revolutionaries and, finally, people who are neutral with regard to the dispute under way.

Therefore, the existence of objective history laws, concerning the necessity of historical processes neither does away with men's creative activities nor does it obliterate their freedom. Such laws only create a lasting social ground on which men develop their activities expressing their freedom. Evidently, the human activities are determined one way or another by various social causes, and man's freedom does not mean the possibility of voluntaristic formation of social processes. It is not an absolute freedom - but then absolute freedom means only a fantastic, speculative construction. And if those who invented it fail to find it in real life, they have only themselves to blame for their disappointments. Years ago, Dietzgen was sending to the world of angels those in search of absolute knowledge. We may give the same advice to the partisans of absolute freedom who, saying "Everything or Nothing," despise the only freedom accessible to us: Human freedom.

We are more modest in our demands. We are fully satisfied with human freedom. Let us have a closer look at it:

There exists a third interpretation of the word "freedom." It does not reject either determinism or the action of objective laws of history; by freedom, one simply means the possibility of choosing between various courses of action in one and the same situation. This has an unusually modest sound when compared to the Utopian demands already heard before but is in accordance with the colloquial intuition of the word (it will be recalled that we have left by the side the meaning of "freedom" as equal to action not due to constraint).

For, when referring to freedom colloquially, one has in mind neither determinism nor the action of objective historical necessity but precisely situations like the following:

In the society, two camps are at war, and I wonder whether to join the camp of the revolution or that of its adversaries. I can do either one or the other, and so am free, and as a free man will choose one of the two sides, having weighed all that is for and against it from the general human, national, and my own personal point of view. Of course, my will is determined by some causes as otherwise I would have been unable to reach any decision at all. Evidently, some laws of social progress are involved, laws affecting the outcome of the struggle, and I am trying to decipher them when reaching my decision. But all that does not curtail my freedom. On the contrary, it is only now that I am free, as otherwise there would have been chaos in which freedom - freedom of choice of a set of values and of action corresponding thereto would have lost all sense. It is simply this: To me, "freedom" means something else than to the representatives of the competing viewpoints as described above.

This means that I am free whenever I may choose, and the choice depends upon me. As an individual, I appear in my most concrete form, and so with all my social conditions without which, instead of being concrete, of being "the whole social relationships," I would have been abstract, an idealized product of imagination. Thus, I am free both on grounds of determinism, and within its framework. I am also free in situations in which I am deprived of freedom. For this paradox we are, of course, indebted to the ambiguity of the word "freedom" as used here. But a real and important matter is involved: Here I am, in fetters, threatened with death, but I still have the right and possibility of choice: To live as a traitor, or to die with dignity, remaining true to my cause. Thus, while in fetters, I am free.

We can see that this concept of freedom, both narrower and more modest in appearance, is in fact much wider and more important than its proud and pretentious competitors. Appearances to the contrary, whither do chimeras of absolute freedom lead if not to resignation and disenchantment? Practice shall always show there is no such freedom anywhere.

This shows that giving up Utopias does not lead to renouncing freedom but to the achievement of its realistic concept, mobilizing for struggle for ideals, such as they may be. For an addition to the struggle against physical constraint, there is also that for freedom of choice, a war against oneself, against one's own cowardice, opportunism, softness of character etc. Nobody can take such freedom away from us unless we blot it out ourselves. There is always that possibility remaining: Suffering, or even death, however our inner, essential freedom is maintained. This freedom one should learn, and teach, first of all through setting an example. This concept of freedom gives the lie to all the philosophies of despair, to all theories of man "alone," "condemned to choice," and "living in fear." In spite of its modesty, it is an optimistic concept, one of faith in man, in man's social essence.

The concept of freedom remains within a close, organic bond with comprehension of the meaning (aim) of life. It also remains even more closely connected with the matter of responsibility. For in this concept, freedom is enacted through choice, primarily in situations of conflict, i.e. in such in which every act of choice results in both good and evil. The choice is hard, and precisely here the problem of responsibility, so important in life makes its appearance.

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